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constituted reckless disregard for the truth. 55 He argued that he did not
necessarily disagree that the basis of liability should include negligence but
would leave to another day the adjudication of that issue.5 8
Lanza will have significant impact on the issue of scienter. 7 It acted to
clarify the confusion that resulted from the seeming relaxation of the need
for scienter. The case provides a definitive framework to be utilized by

both the judicary and those persons who require a benchmark to measure that
conduct on which liability may be imposed. In the absence of participation
in the primary wrongdoing or violation of an independent duty by the defendant, imposition of liability under an aiding and abetting or conspiracy
theory will require a proof of actual or constructive knowledge.A8
By enunciating in clear terms what conduct will be held actionable under Rule 1Ob-5 and what conduct will not be, the court has brought the judicial language of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit into harmony
with both the factual basis of decided cases and the Congressional intent
of the Acts it seeks to interpret.
Robert F. Nelson

GARAGEMEN'S LIENS-Procedural Due Process-A
Prejudgment Remedy Must Provide Notice
And A Prior Hearing
Quebec v. Bud's Auto Service, 105 Cal. Rptr. 677 (App. Dep't 1973).
Ralph and Elsa Quebec instituted an action against Bud's Auto Service
for conversion, alleging in the complaint that after the defendant had completed repairs on plaintiff's motor vehicle and payment had been made, the
55. Id. at 93,843 (dissenting opinion).
56. Id. at 93,844 (dissenting opinion).
57. The majority, by agreeing with the trial court's findings of facts, i.e., that
defendant Coleman neither participated in nor knew of any deception practiced upon
the plaintiffs, was provided with a unique fact situation allowing them to decide that
point on a negligence/scienter continuum at which liability will be imposed. Among
the factors contributing to the weight the opinion will receive is that it is a private
suit for damages rather than a public enforcement action, and that a substantive
test is provided to determine actionable conduct. For recent cases citing Lanza, see,
e.g., Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
93,983 at 93,941
(2d Cir. May 9, 1973); Pearlman v. Gennaro, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
94,006 at
94,053 (S.D.N.Y. May 31, 1973).
58. Lanza v. Drexel & Co., CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 1 93,959 at 93,829-30 (2d
Cir. April 26, 1973).
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vehicle ceased working. Defendant then towed the vehicle to its place of
business and performed additional labor. Upon completion of the work, defendant refused to return the vehicle until the plaintiffs paid for the subsequent repairs.
The defendant relied on the California garagemen's lien provisions which
permitted a garage owner to retain possession of the vehicle until the debt
was discharged.' Plaintiffs conceded that these statutes provided a sufficient defense to the charge. They alleged, however, that the provisions
failed to provide them with an opportunity to be heard or notice of the
hearing before being deprived of their property, and as such, violated due
process of law. After submission of the evidence, the trial court dismissed
plaintiff's suit and plaintiff appealed. Held-Reversed. A prejudgment
remedy that fails to provide notice and a prior hearing amounts to a deprivation of property without due process of law and is therefore unconstitu'2
tional except in "extraordinary situations."
The ability to place a lien upon a man's property, such as to temporarily
deprive him of its beneficial use, without any judicial determination of
probable cause8 dates back not only to medieval England but also to
Roman times.
This quotation demonstrates that historically, special advantages have been
given to creditors in order to assist them in receiving satisfaction for debts.
The premise that a judical determination of probable cause is unnecessary
was never seriously debated in this country, notwithstanding the demands
of procedural due process under our Constitution. 4 Recent case law, however, has begun to view the validity of this procedure in a new light. 5
A lien may be broadly defined as a charge or security upon property, real
or personal, in order to secure the payment of a debt or obligation.6 Its specific classification is usually dependent upon its source; for example, common law, constitution, contract and statute. 7 The garageman's lien is a
product of the last category, none having existed at common law.8 Nevertheless, even in the absence of statute, many courts confronted with suits
regarding repairs on automobiles, applied principles of the common law.9
1. CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 3051-2, 3068-75 (Deering 1972).

2. Quebec v. Bud's Auto Serv., 105 Cal. Rptr. 677, 679 (App. Dep't 1973).
3. Family Fin. Corp. v. Sniadach, 154 N.W.2d 259, 264 (Wis. 1967).
4. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 which provides: "[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law ...."
5. E.g., Hall v. Garson, 468 F.2d 845 (5th Cir. 1972); Collins v. Viceroy Hotel
Corp., 338 F. Supp. 390 (N.D. Ill. 1972).
6. Gray v. Home, 119 P.2d 779, 780 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1948).
7. 53 C.J.S. Liens § 2 (1948).
8. Winton Co. v. Meister, 105 A. 301, 302 (Md. 1918).
9. Willis v. La Fayette-Phoenix Garage Co., 260 S.W. 364 (Ky. 1924). The
court here stated:
Before the enactment of statutes on the subject, mechanics and repairmen could
retain a machine, whether an automobile or not, for the reasonable charges incurred in making repairs thereon at the instance of the owner or his representative,
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In addition to imposing an expressed obligation upon those who are delinquent in payment, modern statutory provisions have created a new mode
of enforcement-the public sale.' 0 Under the common law there existed
no means of enforcement of a possessory lien, barring a suit to obtain a
writ of execution on the property" unless, of course, the parties contracted
otherwise. With the enactment of public sale legislation, the lienholder was
given an alternative method of satisfying the debt. He could seek a judgment to foreclose the lien, yet often the amount of the lien was too small
to foment litigation in the courts. By complying with the statutory procedure, however, similar results could be accomplished by the public sale
with a minimum of effort and expense.
Fundamentally, state statutes provide that a garage owner, if in possession of the vehicle, must notify the owner of the auto that the repairs are
completed and payment is due. 12 If the bill remains unpaid for the period
of time provided for by the statute, the garage owner may give notice to the
owner of the vehicle that the car will be sold at public auction. 13 The proceeds of the sale are divided, the lienholder receiving the amount necessary
to discharge the debt and the owner of the vehicle being entitled to the excess, if any. 1 4 Although the requirements vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, particularly in regard to notification and the time of notice,' 5 all
are materially alike.' The statutes do not require a judge to determine if a
sale to satisfy the lien is warranted. 17 Under some, it is not even necessary
to demonstrate that the cost of repairs is fair or reasonable; mere proand this part of the act does not enlarge the common law, but merely reasserts it.
Id. at 366.
10. A definition of a public sale has been succinctly stated as "one where the
public is invited to participate and given full opportunity to bid on a competitive
basis for the property placed on sale, which is sold to the highest bidder." In re
Katleman's Estate, 269 P.2d 257, 263 (Nev. 1954).
11. 53 C.J.S. Liens § 19 (1948).
12. See, e.g., ALAS. STAT. § 34.35.175 (1971); CAL. CIV. CODE § 3051(a) (Deering
1972); GA. CODE ANN. § 67-2401 (1967); TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5504 (Supp.
1972).
13. See, e.g., CAL. CIv. CODE § 3052 (Deering 1972); IOWA CODE ANN. § 579.2
(1950).
14. E.g., TEX. REv. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5504 (Supp. 1972) which provides:
When possession . . . has continued for sixty days after the charges accrue,
and the charges so due have not been paid . . . the persons so holding said property . . . are authorized to sell said property at public sale and apply the proceeds to the payment of said charges, and shall pay over the balance to the person
entitled to the same.
15. E.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 51-406 (1971) (owner has 30 days to pay bill; if not
paid garagemen has to notify owner by letter and post a notice in five public places);
DEL. CODE ANN. ch. 25 § 39.01 (1953) (no letter is needed, only notice in five
public places and a newspaper publication 10 days before the sale).
16. See Annot., 62 A.L.R. 1485 (1929).
17. See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 33 § 25 (Supp. 1971); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 51-404
to 51-412 (1971); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 86-1-5 to 86-1-8 (1963); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 25 § 3901 (1953); TENN. CODE ANN. § 64-1903 (1955).
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nouncement that the debt is unpaid is enough.1 8 At least one state permits a
commissioner to hear the owner's plea before a sale is authorized. 19 Under
no statute, however, does one find a stipulation that the debtor has an opportunity for a judicial hearing before state sanction of the sale of the vehicle.
In recognition of these provisions, the vehicle owner often finds himself
in a dilemma. When he believes that cost of the repairs is excessive or unreasonable, or that the repairs actually completed were unnecessary, his remedies are limited. He may pay the money allegedly due which will extinguish not only the debt, but also any opportunity to contest the validity of the
charges or the extent of repairs. 20 The alternative is to forgo payment
and retain an attorney to bring an action for conversion against the garageman. 2 ' In this instance, however, it is the garage owner who is entitled to
retain possession of the vehicle pending trial and judgment. 22 Such a solution becomes both expensive and inconvenient to an owner whose vehicle
may constitute a necessity, not simply a luxury. Consequently, the latter option is rarely exercised.
In the instant case, 23 Ralph Quebec elected to bring an action contesting
not only the validity of the repair charges, but also the summary procedure
of collecting the debt permitted by the garagemen's lien statutes. 24 The
statutes, Quebec contended, were in violation of the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment which requires both notice and a hearing before one may be deprived of possession or use of his property. 25 Before
resolving this precise issue, the court evaluated the procedural requirements
stipulated in the garagemen's lien statutes. 26 Section 3051 of the California
Civil Code provides in part, that
18. E.g., ALAS. STAT. § 34.35.175 (1971); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 86.08 (1964); ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 82, § 47a (Supp. 1973).

19. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 49-61 (Supp. 1973).
20. Comment, The Application of Sniadach To Banker's And Garageman's Liens,
4 Sw. L. REV. 285, 302 (1972).
21. Id. at 302.

22. If the garage owner has voluntarily returned the vehicle to the owner, he may
lose his right to possession. Texas Hydraulic & Equip. Co. v. Associates Discount
Corp., 414 S.W.2d 199 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1967, no writ).
23. Quebec v. Bud's Auto Serv., 105 Cal. Rptr. 677 (App. Dep't 1973).
24. CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 3051-52, 3068-75 (Deering 1972).

25. A similar contention was debated in Willis v. La Fayette-Phoenix Garage Co.,
260 S.W. 364, 367 (Ky. 1924). The argument was not sustained, however, the court
noting that:
[D]ue process of law is any legal procedure enforced by public authority, whether
sanctioned by age or custom, or newly devised in the discretion of the legislative
power, in furtherance of the general public good, which regards and preserves

these principles of liberty and justice.
The court based its decision on the fact that a court of equity could enforce the lien
for repairs and that this was sufficient to meet "due process." The Kentucky provisions, however, also allowed a sale of the vehicle without the assistance of the

courts, but the court never separated these two forms of enforcement.
26. CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 3051-52, 3068-75 (Deering 1972).

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol5/iss2/11

4

Noonan: A Prejudgment Remedy Myst Provide Notice and a Prior Hearing.

ST. MARY'S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 5

[K]eepers of garages for automobiles shall have a lien, dependant on
possession, for their compensation in caring for and safekeeping, and
for making repairs and performing any labor upon or furnishing supplies
or materials for such automobiles.
If the owner of the vehicle neglects or refuses to pay within 10 days of the
due date, the garageman in possession may commence proceedings to sell
the vehicle at public auction. 27 Not less than 10 nor more than 20 days prior
to the sale, notice must be afforded the vehicle owner by registered mail
and advertisement in a local newspaper. 28 Possession of the vehicle is re29
tained by the garageman until the bill is paid or the car is sold.

After summarizing this procedure, the court took cognizance of the fact
that the vehicle owner was not given an opportunity to be heard before the
continued retention or the sale of the vehicle. The court then stated what
they considered to be the appropriate rule: "It no longer is left to doubt that
the general rule is that prejudgment remedies not providing notice and
hearing opportunity violate due process except in extraordinary situations." 80
To arrive at this conclusion the court relied upon four cases A Although
the facts involved in the cases cited were different, the question of law
to be decided in each was essentially the same.
The first case relied upon by the court was Sniadach v. Family Finance
Corp.s 2 The case involved a Wisconsin garnishment procedure which permitted a defendant's wages to be frozen while a debt controversy was pending.3 3 No provision for a hearing or notice prior to the time that the garnish27. CAL. CIv. CODE § 3052 (Deering 1972) provides:
If the person entitled to the lien provided in Section 3051 of this code be not
paid the amount due, and for which said lien is given, within ten (10) days after
the same shall have become due, then such lien holder may proceed to sell said
property, or so much thereof as may be necessary to satisfy said lien and costs of
sale at public auction, and by giving at least ten (10) but not more than twenty
(20) days' previous notice of such sale by advertising in some newspaper published
in the county in which said property is situated; or if there be no newspaper
printed in such county, then by posting notice of sale in three (3) of the most
public places in the town or place where such property is to be sold, for ten (10)
days previous to the date of the sale; provided, however, that prior to the sale of
any automobile or trailer to satisfy any such lien, twenty (20) days' notice by
registered mail shall be given to the legal owner and to the registered owner of
such vehicle, if registered in this State as the same appear in the registration certificate, and also to the Division of Motor Vehicles by registered letter; and the
Division of Motor Vehicles shall in like manner immediately notify said legal
owner and said registered owner of said proposed sale, but failure on the part of
said division to givd such notice shall not affect the validity of any such sale ....
28. Id.
29. First Nat'l Bank v. Silva, 254 P. 262 (Cal. 1927).
30. Quebec v. Bud's Auto Serv., 105 Cal. Rptr. 677, 679 (App. Dep't 1973).
31. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395
U.S. 337 (1969); Blair v. Pitchess, 96 Cal. Rptr. 42 (1971); Randone v. Appellate
Dep't, 96 Cal. Rptr. 709 (1971), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 924 (1972).
32. 395 U.S. 337 (1969). The finance company had commenced garnishment
proceedings naming Sniadach as defendant to recover some $420 on a promissory
note.
33. Under Wisconsin procedure, a clerk of the court would issue a summons to the
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ment became effective was included in the statutes.

After analyzing this

procedure the Supreme Court of the United States concluded:
Such summary procedure may well meet the requirements of due process in extraordinary situations. But in the present case no situation
requiring special protection to the state or creditor interest is provided ....
The right to be heard "has little reality or worth unless one is informed that the matter is pending and can choose for himself whether
to appear or default, acquiesce or contest."8 4
The standard announced by the Court appeared to be a mere reiteration of
principles firmly established by prior decisions.a 5 The right to be heard at a
meaningful time and manner had been a central doctrine of due process for
more than a century.3 6 The importance of the Sniadach decision rests in
the Court's determination that a deprivation of property occurs not only
when the legal owner has his property wrongfully taken, but also when he is
37
deprived of the use of his property before a final judgment.
Subsequent to the Sniadach case, both state and federal courts took op38
posing viewpoints concerning the true basis of the Sniadach holding.
Some courts reasoned that although the opinion made reference to the hardship of garnishment of wages, no valid distinction between wages and other
property could be maintained.3 9 Courts taking a "stricter" approach agreed
that Sniadach merely "carved out an exception for wage earners," thus it
creditor's lawyer, who had to serve the summons and the complaint on the defendant
within 10 days. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 267.07(1) (Supp. 1973). The garnishee, prior to
a 1969 amendment, was entrusted to retain the defendant's property and provide no
payment therefor except for a subsistence allowance. Wis. L. 1965, ch. 507 § 1, as
amended Wis. STAT. ANN. § 267.04 (Supp. 1973). During the interim before final
judgment, the amount that was to serve as subsistence was provided in Wis. L. 1965,
ch. 507, § 1, as amended Wis. STAT. ANN. § 267.18 (Supp. 1973) which allowed
payment "in the sum of $25 in the case of an individual without dependents or $40
in the case of an individual with dependents; but in no event in excess of 50 per cent of
the wages or salary owing."
34. Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 339 (1969) (citations omitted).
35. E.g., Opp Cotton Mills v. Administrator, 312 U.S. 126, 153 (1940); United
States v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 291 U.S. 457, 460 (1934); Southern Ry. v. Virginia,
290 U.S. 190, 194 (1933); Londoner v. City & County, 210 U.S. 373, 385 (1908);
Glidden v. Harrington, 189 U.S. 255, 258 (1903).
36. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965); Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385
(1914); Havey v. Elliot, 167 U.S. 409 (1897); Windsor v. McVeigh, 93 U.S. 274
(1876); Baldwin v. Hale, 68 U.S. 223 (1863). Prior to Sniadach, however, the courts
held that due process requires an opportunity to be heard at some stage of the proceedings. Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594 (1950).
37. See Note, The Supreme Court, 1968 Term, 83 HARV. L. RPv. 7, 114 (1969).
38. A remark made by the Supreme Court provided the impetus for a controversy: "We deal here with wages-a specialized type of property presenting distinct
problems in our economic system." Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337,
340 (1969).
39. E.g., Randone v. Appellate Dep't, 96 Cal. Rptr. 709 (1971); Larson v. Fetherstone, 172 N.W.2d 20 (Wis. 1969) (garnishment proceeding).
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did not affect the validity of other prejudgment seizures. 40 The controversy
was further extended when a later case decided by the Supreme Court involving prejudgment remedies did little to alleviate the disparity of opinion. 41
In California, the courts were early adherents to the more "liberal" reading of Sniadach, applying the notice and prior hearing doctrine not only to
their own method for garnishment of wages, 42 but extending it to other summary procedures. 43 The claim and delivery statutes 44 were held unconstitutional by the California Supreme Court in the case of Blair v. Pitchess.45
The deprivation in Blair was not merely the "use" of the property. Rather it
involved the intrusion of a state agent into the possessor's home to physically
remove the property from the premises. In principle, however, both methods, garnishment of wages and claim and delivery, constitute a "taking"
46
without due process of law.
Shortly thereafter, in Randone v. Appellate Department,47 the attachment
statutes were questioned on similar grounds. Again the procedure involved
failed to satisfy the due process mandates of notice and a prior hearing. The
Supreme Court of California, citing Blair as conclusive authority, announced:
40. American Olean Tile Co. v. Zimmerman, 317 F. Supp. 150, 152 (D. Hawaii
1970); see Klim v. Jones, 315 F. Supp. 109 (N.D. Cal. 1970); Reeves v. Motor
Contract Co., 324 F. Supp. 1011 (N.D. Ga. 1971).
41. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970). In this case, appellees were welfare
recipients whose benefits were suddenly terminated without notice. The Supreme
Court held that the fact a hearing was provided after the termination of benefits was
insufficient to satisfy due process. Once again, however, the language used in the
decision indicated that the case involved special circumstances. The Court in Goldberg
quoted from an earlier decision in stating: "Suffice it to say that to cut off a welfare
recipient in the face of . . 'brutal need' without a prior hearing of some sort is unconscionable ....
Id. at 261, quoting Kelly v. Wyman, 294 F. Supp. 893, 899
(1968).
42. McCallop v. Carberry, 83 Cal. Rptr. 666 (1970); accord, Cline v. Credit
Bureau, 83 Cal. Rptr. 669 (1970).
43. Randone v. Appellate Dep't, 96 Cal. Rptr. 709, 712 (1971), declaring unconstitutional CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. §§ 537-561 (Deering 1954); Blair v. Pitchess, 96
Cal. Rptr. 42 (1971), holding the procedure of the claim and delivery statutes unconstitutional, CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. §§ 509-521 (Deering 1954).
44. CAL. CODE Civ. PROC. §§ 509-521 (Deering 1954).
45. 96 Cal. Rptr. 42 (1971). The court in analyzing the statutory procedure noted
that a party must file an affidavit stating that he owns or is entitled to the property in
question and that the defendant is wrongfully detaining it. Once the affidavit is filed,
a summons is issued and the party may require the sheriff, constable or marshal to
retake possession from the defendant. A possessor was often unaware that the summons had issued until the sheriff was knocking at the door demanding the goods.
A defendant's opportunity to be heard existed only after the seizure had been completed. Id. at 46-48.
46. Blair v. Pitchess, 96 Cal. Rptr. 42, 56 (1971).
47. 96 Cal. Rptr. 709 (1971). Under California attachment provisions, a creditor
was permitted to attach any property of the debtor upon a filing of an action to recover the debt. This practice had become the most flexible mode of satisfaction for
creditors owing first, to its broad Provisions and second, to its reference to any property.
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Blair fully recognized that the Sniadach decision did not establish a
new constitutional rule for wages, but on the contrary, simply brought
the traditional procedural due process analysis . . . to bear
upon the
prejudgment remedies. 48

question of the validity of summary
These two cases, Blair and Randone, unmistakably informed creditors in
California that all summary procedures were susceptible to attack on constitutional grounds.
Although the position of the courts in regard to prejudgment remedies
was becoming settled in California, an authoritative response to the Sniadach
controversy was not heard from the United States Supreme Court until the
landmark case of Fuentes v. Shevin.49 The Fuentes case involved replevin
provisions which permitted repossession of goods upon default of payment under conditional sales contracts by the filing of an affidavit to that effect.50
The Supreme Court held the statutes unconstitutional, relying upon the principles that Sniadach had previously established. 51
In the instant case, the court apparently started with the premise that the
garagemen's lien procedure was unconstitutional. The only issue presented
was whether this lien came within the purview of the "extraordinary situations" referred to in Sniadach, that is, special need for protection of a state
48. 96 Cal. Rptr. 709, 717 (1971).
49. 407 U.S. 67 (1972). Mrs. Fuentes had purchased a stereo and a stove under
a conditional sales contract. Both articles were part of one account, therefore, when
the stove stopped working and Mrs. Fuentes stopped payment on the stove, she was
also in default on the stereo. Firestone Tire and Rubber Company, from whom the
goods were bought, retained legal title, until final payment. Four other plaintiffs were
joined in the suit. Three others had also been involved in replevin proceedings subsequent to default in monthly installment charges, the fourth having recently obtained a divorce from her husband. This latter defendant became involved when, during a custody dispute, the husband obtained a writ of replevin and repossessed their
child's clothes, furniture and toys.
50. Under the Florida provisions: "Any person whose goods or chattels are
wrongfully detained . . . may have a writ of replevin to recover them ....... No notice or opportunity of a prior hearing is provided. The plaintiff merely makes an
assertion that he is entitled to the property. FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 78.01-78.13 (Supp.
1972). The Pennsylvania statutes are essentially the same, however, there is no requirement that there ever be a hearing on the merits. PA. RULES CIv. PROC. 10711086 (1967).
51. Sniadach was not limited to wages according to the Fuentes decision, but
rather it was "in the mainstream of past cases . . . establishing that due process requires an opportunity for a hearing before a deprivation of property takes effect."
Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, -, 92 S. Ct. 1983, 1998, 32 L. Ed. 2d 556, 574 (1972).
The Fuentes opinion implied that the Supreme Court considered the applicable law to
be well settled.
At least one court, however, has refused to follow Fuentes. Roofing Wholesale Co.
v. Palmer, 502 P.2d 1327, 1329 (Ariz. 1973). The court in Palmer noted that the
Fuentes decision, if followed, would render the Arizona garnishment statutes unconstitutional. The court, however, felt that the Fuentes decision was not binding because
the Supreme Court had not decided the issue by a clear majority (4-3-2 decision).
This reasoning would leave many decisions beyond the reach of stare decisis.
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or creditor interest. 52 The court, quoting Fuentes, noted the types of situations previously deemed extraordinary:
First, in each case, the seizure has been directly necessary to secure an
important governmental or general public interest. Second, there has
been a special need for very prompt action. Third, the State has kept
strict control over its monopoly of legitimate force: the person initiating the seizure has been a government official responsible for determining, under the standards of a narrowly drawn
53 statute, that it was necessary and justified in the particular instance.
The court in considering the position of the garage owner and the vehicle
owner, viewed it as nothing more than a mere debtor-creditor relationship.
The opinion stated that the government surely had no more interest in this
type of debt than in others of its kind created and terminated daily, nor had
the evidence presented any substantial need for special creditor protection.54
Consequently, no adequate justification having been ascertained, the court's
conclusion was unavoidable: "The statutes herein contain the same evils
found in Sniadach, Fuentes, Blair and Randone."5 5 This being true, they
were held to be clearly unconstitutional.
Although the possessory lien issue in the Quebec case was one of first impression, the court had little difficulty in extending the constitutional mandates of procedural due process to obvious violations inherent in the specific statutes. While it is conceded that under garagemen's lien statutes possession is relinquished voluntarily, the retention of possession by the garage
owner during the dispute is certainly a "taking" of the owner's use of his vehicle. It is no answer to say that the deprivation is only temporary. Even
"[A] temporary, non-final deprivation of property is nonetheless a 'deprivation' in the terms of the Fourteenth Amendment." 56 Moreover, under
most existing statutes the garage owner may deprive the owner permanently through the extra-judicial process of public sale. These statutes
then become, in practice, more oppressive than the prejudgment remedies
previously held unconstitutional by the Supreme Court.
52. In four cases cited by Sniadach, "extraordinary situations" were presented.
A prejudgment remedy was available to enable government seizure of mislabeled goods.
Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594 (1950). Another exception was
found where the appointment of a conservator was necessary in view of a delicate
banking situation. Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245 (1947). In Coffin Bro. & Co. v.
Bennett, 277 U.S. 29 (1928), attachment was allowed without notice to protect against
a bank failure. Finally, attachment was permitted in order to secure jurisdiction in a
state court. Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94 (1921).
53. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, -, 92 S. Ct. 1983, 2000, 32 L. Ed. 2d 556,
576 (1972).
54. Quebec v. Bud's Auto Serv., 105 Cal. Rptr. 677, 680 (App. Dep't 1973).
55. Id. at 680.
56. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, -, 92 S. Ct. 1983, 1996, 32 L. Ed. 2d 556,
572 (1972).
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CASE NOTES

For many years the creditors of this country have enjoyed the benefits of
prejudgment remedies conferred upon them by statute. The validity of the
procedures being unquestioned, the debtor was put in a position of subservience to the creditor's demands. Recent decisions in the area of prejudgment remedies suggests, however, that future litigation and legislation will
create a balancing of the debtor-creditor relationship. Liens dealing
with innkeepers, 57 landlords,5 8 and now garage owners have all been declared violative of due process. Garnishment and attachment procedures
have encountered a similar fate. Yet, as in other areas where breakthroughs
have been achieved, many questions raised by the cases remain unanswered.
For example, what kind of hearing is necessary to satisfy due process? At
59
The effect of a conleast one court noted the problem, but without reply.
tractual waiver of one's right to be heard has led courts down dissimilar
paths, 60 as has the status of the self-help provision of the Uniform Commercial
Code. 6 ' Ultimately, these conflicts will have to be resolved, either by decision or statute. It is hoped that during the re-evaluation of the debtorcreditor relationship vis-a-vis due process, that other oppressive measures
not requiring judicial involvement will be denounced.
Michael J. Noonan
57. Collins v. Viceroy Hotel Corp., 338 F. Supp. 390 (N.D. Ill. 1972), declaring
unconstitutional the summary procedure found in ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 71, § 2 and ch.
82, § 57 (1969) which allowed an owner of a hotel to acquire a lien upon the personal
property of a guest who failed to pay the rent.
58. Hall v. Garson, 468 F.2d 845 (5th Cir. 1972). Under Texas law, TEx. REV.
CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5238a (Supp. 1972), a landlord was given a lien on the personal
property belonging to the tenant that was located within the dwelling if the rent was
not paid. Like other lien statutes under discussion, the landlord retained possession of
the seized articles until the rent was paid.
59. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972) made some very general statements
about the problem but eventually determined it was a matter for the legislature, not the
judiciary. They did announce, however, that the nature and form of the hearing are
"open to many potential variations." The hearing must be such as to establish probable validity of the claim in question. Id. at -, 92 S. Ct. at 2002, 32 L. Ed. 2d at
578.
60. See Buckner v. Carmack, 272 So. 2d 326, 330 (La. 1973) where the court
held that "a contractual confession of judgment . . . effectively waives the right to a
routine adversary hearing." Contra, Etheredge v. Bradley, 502 P.2d 146 (Alas. 1972).
The interest aroused by the recent cases is exemplified by the fact that in the
Louisiana case cited above, over one page in the Southern Reporter is needed just to
list the attorneys who filed amici curiae briefs. The opinion itself is less than three
pages long.
61. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-503 provides:
Unless otherwise agreed a secured party has on default the right to take possession of the collateral. In taking the possession the secured party may proceed
without judicial process if this can be done without breach of the peace or may
proceed by action.
The above section has been declared unconstitutional in Adams v. Egley, 338 F. Supp.
614 (S.D. Cal. 1972), yet upheld in Messenger v. Sandy Motors, Inc., 295 A2d 402
(Super. Ct. N.J. 1972).
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